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ABSTRACT: Using a linked employer-employee data set for Germany, this paper 
analyzes labour fluctuation and wage setting in a cohort of newly founded and 
other establishments from 1997 to 2001. We show empirically that start-ups tend 
to have higher labour turnover rates, ceteris paribus. Moreover, bargaining 
coverage rates and wages in new firms are lower than in similar incumbent firms. 
Both the excess labour fluctuation and the wage differential are shown to decline 
and become insignificant over time as the newly founded firms mature. Our results 
imply that it takes a new firm only a few years to become an incumbent firm. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Unter Verwendung eines kombinierten Firmen-Beschäftigten-
Datensatzes für Deutschland analysiert dieser Beitrag die Arbeitskräftefluktuation 
und die Lohnsetzung in einer Kohorte von neu gegründeten und anderen 
Betrieben im Zeitraum von 1997 bis 2001. Wir zeigen empirisch, dass 
Neugründungen ceteris paribus tendenziell höhere Arbeitskräftefluktuationsraten 
aufweisen. Überdies liegen die Tarifbindungsquoten und die Löhne in 
Neugründungen unter denen in vergleichbaren bestehenden Betrieben. Es zeigt 
sich, dass mit der Reifung der Betriebe im Zeitablauf sowohl die erhöhte 
Arbeitskräftefluktuation als auch das Lohndifferenzial zurückgehen und schließlich 
insignifikant werden. Unsere Ergebnisse implizieren, dass es nur ein paar Jahre 
dauert, bis ein neues Unternehmen zu einem bestehenden Unternehmen wird.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic policy in Germany strongly stimulates the founding of new firms, not 
least because politicians hope that new firms may create the additional 
employment so much needed in Germany. In order to find out whether this is really 
the case and how successful new firms are, a growing empirical literature has 
studied the performance of new firms at various levels of aggregation. At the micro 
level, i.e. using data of individual firms or establishments, quite a few studies have 
been published in the last decade that analyze the success of newly founded firms 
over the years in terms of survival rates, employment growth, and other indicators 
of firm performance (see, e.g., Wagner 1994, Brüderl et al. 1996, Brixy and Kohaut 
1999, Almus 2002). From a macro perspective, using the concepts of job creation, 
job destruction and job turnover, a number of studies have tried to identify the 
extent to which new firms contribute to aggregate employment growth (see, e.g., 
Boeri and Cramer 1991, Bellmann et al. 1996, Gerlach and Wagner 1997, Turk 
2002, Brixy and Grotz 2004).
1 
 
Most of this research has concentrated on the number of new jobs created, 
although the persistence of these jobs has also been taken in consideration. This 
reflects the insight that what is important is not only the quantity but also the 
quality of (new) jobs. The quality of employment has also been stressed recently 
by the European Commission (2001: ch. 4) and is part of its employment strategy. 
While it may be difficult to define and measure the characteristics which best 
reflect job quality, wages and working conditions as well as labour fluctuation in 
the plant are surely among potential indicators. Whether these indicators differ 
between newly founded and incumbent firms has received surprisingly little 
attention in empirical research so far. It would also be interesting to know whether 
such differences – if they exist – vanish over time once the new business matures 
and how fast such a convergence takes place. In other words, we do not know 
how long it takes until a new firm becomes an incumbent firm. 
 
This paper seeks to overcome this research deficit by analyzing differences in 
wages, bargaining coverage and labour fluctuation between newly founded and 
other firms in Germany in the period 1997 to 2001. It makes use of a 
representative sample of establishments that were founded in 1995/96 and that 
form part of a large-scale set of establishment data in Germany. This unique data 
                                             
1 International studies at the micro level include Dunne et al. (1989) for the US and Storey (1994) 
for the UK; macro analyses are provided, inter alia, by Davis et al. (1996) for the US and Barnes 
and Haskel (2002) for the UK.   4
set is described in section  2. Section  3 analyzes the determinants of labour 
fluctuation and traces the observed differences in labour turnover of the cohort of 
newly founded establishments over time. In a similar way the wage differential of 
newly founded establishments is investigated in Section 4, and their bargaining 
coverage is compared to that of other plants. Section 5 provides some concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. THE DATA 
The data used in this study is derived from two sources that are closely 
interrelated and together form an employer-employee data set. The employee side 
of the data set is the “German Employment Statistics“, which is sometimes also 
called the “German Social Insurance Statistics” (see Fritsch and Brixy 2004 for 
details). It requires all public and private employers to report certain information 
about every employee who is subject to obligatory social insurance, i.e. health and 
unemployment insurance along with pension funds. Misreporting is legally 
sanctioned. The information collected is transformed into an establishment file that 
provides longitudinal information about the establishments and their employees 
and which is called “IAB Establishment Register”.
2 A great advantage of this 
database is that it covers all establishments that employ at last one employee who 
is liable to social insurance. The attributes of each firm covered in this database 
are the number of employees, their sex, age, and qualification (four levels) as well 
as the wages and salaries paid and the exact duration of the engagement in days. 
Although these data refer to individuals, only aggregate data at establishment level 
were available to us. 
 
The employer side of our data set is given by the “IAB Establishment Panel”, a 
random sample of establishments from the comprehensive IAB Establishment 
Register drawn according to the principle of optimal stratification. The stratification 
cells are defined by ten classes for the size of the establishment and by 16 
economic sectors. This selection process means that the selection probability of 
an establishment increases with its size. Every year since 1993 (1996) the IAB 
Establishment Panel has surveyed the same establishments from all branches and 
different size categories in western (eastern) Germany. In order to correct for 
panel mortality, exits and newly founded establishments, the panel is augmented 
regularly. The questionnaire covers a wide variety of questions which can be used 
                                             
2    IAB is an acronym for Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, which is the research 
institute of the German Federal Employment Agency.   5
for our analysis, such as information on the legal form, the profit situation and the 
location of the establishment, the state of production technology and on bargaining 
coverage. Data are collected in personal interviews with the owners or senior 
managers of the establishments by professional interviewers.
3 
 
In 1997 a representative sample of establishments that reported under a new firm-
identification-number in the employment statistics was drawn and integrated into 
the IAB Establishment Panel. From this sample 826 newly founded establishments 
can be used in our analysis, 368 of which can be traced every year until 2001 
(although not all of these establishments provide information on all variables in 
every year). Each of these newly founded establishments hired its first employee 
between 1  July, 1995 and 30  June, 1996. Our sample was restricted to 
establishments that had less than 200 employees in 1997
4 and that were in private 
ownership of one or more founders but were not owned by other firms, so there 
are no derivative foundations. The development of these newly founded 
establishments is contrasted with 4525 incumbent establishments from the private 
sector that had already existed in 1996 and had employed at least one and less 
than 200 employees in 1997. Of these establishments, 3083 could be traced in 
every year until 2001, the last year for which information from the employees’ and 
employers’ side is available. 
 
In our empirical analysis we predominantly make use of the data from the IAB 
Establishment Panel. In addition, exact data on the composition of the workforce, 
the number of employees, labour fluctuation, and the amount of wages and 
salaries paid in the establishment are supplied from the quasi-official German 
Employment Statistics via the IAB Establishment Register. The data are linked 
through a plant identifier that is available in both data sets. 
 
Some descriptive evidence based on weighted data from our representative set of 
data is presented in Table 1 for western and eastern Germany. The comparison of 
newly founded and incumbent establishments shows that there were substantial 
(and statistically significant) differences between both groups in 1997. On average, 
newly founded firms were much smaller and had a higher share of low-skilled 
employees than incumbent firms. Their export share was slightly higher, and more 
of them said that their production technology was state of the art. New firms were 
also characterized by a higher labour fluctuation (measured by the labour turnover 
                                             
3   Details regarding the IAB Establishment Panel (including information on the questionnaires and 
how to access the data) are given in Kölling (2000). 
4    There is only one newly founded firm that was larger, on average the start-ups had five 
employees.   6
rate, the hiring rate and the departure rate explained below), by a lower bargaining 
coverage and by lower wages than incumbents. It will be interesting to see 
whether these differences still show up in multivariate analyses. 
 
Table 1:   Newly founded and incumbent firms in Germany 1997 
(sample restricted to establishments with less than 200 employees) 


















size (no. of 
employees) 
2.4 8.3 -5.9** 
(-278.1) 




40.5 47.0 -6.5** 
(-40.3) 




17.5 15.5  2.0** 
(15.4) 




1.4 1.6 -0.2** 
(-8.2) 




7.3 2.1 5.2** 
(58.8) 




25.9 24.9  1.0** 
(6.7) 
21.9 16.3  5.7** 
(27.4) 
Export share 
(%, in 1996) 
3.3 2.5 0.9** 
(15.9) 





67 65 2.1** 
(12.4) 




0.7 0.5 0.2** 
(70.0) 
0.7 0.4 0.3** 
(61.6) 
Hiring rate  0.6  0.4  0.2** 
(57.6) 
0.6 0.3 0.3** 
(63.0) 
Departure rate  0.8  0.5  0.2** 
(63.5) 
0.8 0.5 0.4** 
(47.6) 
Covered by a 
collective 
agreement (%) 
39 59 -20** 
(-116.3) 
31 41 -10** 
(-40.5) 
Daily wage (€)  58.4  60.1  -1.7** 
(-15.9) 
42.8 47.1 -4.3** 
(-50.2) 
NOTE:  Weighted data; two-sample t-test with unequal variances; **/* denote statistical significance 
at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics.   7
3. LABOUR FLUCTUATION 
Since newly founded firms, by definition, have no current employees and cannot 
fill vacancies through vocational training or promotion in internal labour markets, 
they need to attract employees from the external labour market. Potential 
employees will compare the quality of the job offered with the quality of their 
current job or with what they are offered by other firms. When assessing quality, 
employees can be expected to look not only at compensation and working 
conditions but also at the (expected) employment stability and the labour 
fluctuation rates in new firms. While some information on these issues is available 
from (aggregate) employment statistics, this is often not precise enough. 
 
It is well known that new firms are more likely to fail than incumbent ones, what 
has been termed “the liability of newness” by Stinchcombe (1965). The risk of 
failure tends to increase in the first year(s) and to decrease non-monotonically 
afterwards.
5 Interestingly, at the aggregate level employment is usually rather 
stable in the sense that the number of employees working in a cohort of firms 
tends to stabilize over time at a level roughly comparable to the size in the year of 
entry since the “decline of employment in a cohort due to exiting firms … is more 
or less compensated by the growth of survivors of the same cohort.” (Wagner 
1994: 144).
6 This observation makes clear that behind the aggregate stability there 
is a lot of heterogeneity: While the majority of firms do not change employment 
size in their first years, some shrink, others die, and a few new firms show a rapid 
expansion and account for the lion’s share of employment growth and of total 
employment after ten years (see Brüderl et al. 1996, Almus 2002, Fritsch and 
Weyh 2004). 
 
These insights are interesting, but they do not fully reflect the labour fluctuation at 
the plant level and individual employees’ chances of employment stability. For 
reasons of data availability most studies are only able to investigate net 
employment flows, that is whether the total number of employees in a plant has 
changed between two points in time. It could well be, however, that several hires 
and departures have taken place in this period whereas the total level of 
employment has remained the same. Since our linked employer-employee data 
                                             
5   Depending on the data sets and the periods of observation used, German studies differ at the 
exact shape and length of this process; see, e.g., Brüderl et al. (1996: 94ff.), Gerlach and 
Wagner (1997), Turk (2002) and Fritsch and Weyh (2004). 
6   While this is a stylised fact for western Germany (see also Boeri and Cramer 1991, Brixy and 
Grotz 2004), in eastern Germany for a short period after unification there seems to have existed 
an exceptionally positive “start-up window” for new firms which resulted in substantial 
employment gains of several cohorts; see Brixy and Kohaut (1999).   8
set contains information on the beginning and the end of each employment 
relationship we are able to analyze gross employment flows and labour fluctuation 
in each plant. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical studies seem to exist 
that have explicitly addressed these issues with German or international data on 
newly founded firms. 
 
For various reasons we would expect newly founded firms to record a higher 
labour fluctuation than similar incumbent firms. Since the likelihood of termination 
of an employment contract (by either party) declines with tenure (Franz 2003: 
197), incumbent firms with a certain history of job matches tend to have higher 
employment stability than newly founded firms hiring their first employees. These 
new firms will have to go through the usual matching process characterized by trial 
and error when attempting to hire suitable employees. In addition, new firms face 
the problem that due to their higher risk of failure (and their lower wages analyzed 
below) they may not be able to poach employees from other firms but may have to 
rely more on attracting workers who are currently unemployed. If unemployed 
people are less able (or willing) to fulfil the requirements of the job, there is a 
higher risk of layoffs or quits in new firms (followed by a new process of hiring). 
Since newly founded firms also tend to face higher uncertainty and fluctuation in 
demand for their products or services while at the same time having less financial 
resources to hoard labour in periods of slack, they may have to adjust employment 
more often than incumbent firms.
7 Over time, these differences should become 
smaller and even vanish once the critical initial period of new employment 
relationships is over and the economic situation of the new firms stabilizes. 
 
For analyzing these issues, an appropriate dependent variable and a well-known 
indicator of labour fluctuation is the labour turnover rate, which is defined as the 
ratio of the sum of hires and departures in a plant over its average employment 
level in a given year. Of course, hires and departures may also be analyzed 
separately, relative to average employment levels.
8 This means that we can make 
use of three dependent variables that reflect various aspects of labour fluctuation, 
                                             
7   The higher chance of failure of newly founded firms could also imply higher departures if firms 
or employees react accordingly when they see the shadow of death sneaking around the corner 
in the months or years before the exit. There is, however, conflicting empirical evidence as to 
whether this is the case in Germany; see Wagner (1999) and Almus (2002). 
8   More precisely, following standard practice and in order to achieve some consistency with the 
rates of hires  /  employment and of departures  /  employment, the labour turnover rate was 
calculated as 0.5 (hires + departures) / employment (see Franz 2003: 194). We dropped a few 
establishments with labour turnover rates of 3 and above since these may reflect some errors in 
the data base (the mean of this rate is about 0.4 in our sample). Note that departures are a 
composite measure that includes dismissals, quits, and retirement, inter alia.   9
with the labour turnover rate being the most encompassing one. We estimate OLS 
regressions for the period 1997 to 2001, making use of stacked cross section 
models for each year as well as pooling the data. Since labour markets and 
economic conditions still differ considerably between western and eastern 
Germany, we provide disaggregated estimates for both regions. 
 
The main interest of our analysis is on the labour fluctuation in newly founded 
firms, which are represented by a dummy variable indicating whether an 
establishment hired its first employee between 1 July, 1995, and 30 June, 1996. 
The other independent variables used are standard in labour turnover regressions 
of this sort.
9 They include establishment size since for purely mechanical reasons 
the labour turnover rate is usually higher in small establishments where the entry 
or exit of one single employee has a higher percentage effect. In order to take 
account of potential non-linearities in this relationship we also include the square 
of establishment size. Potential spill-over effects in personnel policies from the 
mother firm are accounted for by a dummy variable indicating whether the 
establishment is a branch plant or subsidiary. We control for the structure of the 
workforce using the employment shares of female, part-time, and low/high-skilled 
employees and we take into account that establishments with a high proportion of 
fixed-term employees should have a higher labour turnover. Since collective 
bargaining agreements are often said to inhibit labour force adjustments we 
include dummy variables on the existence of sectoral or firm-level collective 
agreements. Employees can be expected not to leave establishments that pay 
well and are in good economic shape. Therefore the average level of wages in the 
establishment, a dummy variable reflecting its subjective assessment of the (“very 
good or good”) profit situation and a dummy variable for its state of production 
technology are included in the analysis. The situation on the regional labour 
market is reflected by the regional rate of unemployment; however, since high 
unemployment might be associated with less quits and hires but more layoffs, its 
total effect on labour turnover is open.
10 As further controls we also include ten 
industry dummies and three dummies for the degree of urbanization at the location 
of the establishment. 
                                             
9   See, for instance, Addison et al. (2001). Note that although we have a relatively rich data set, 
selection of control variables was limited by the fact that information on some potential 
explanatory variables was either never asked (this is the case for the capital stock and for fringe 
benefits) or was not available in all years of our observation period (e.g., existence of a works 
council and profit sharing). 
10  In the estimations with Stata/SE 8.2 we made use of the cluster option to take into account that 
the unemployment data at district level are at a different level of aggregation than the 
establishment data and that the unobserved influences on the dependent variables may be not 
independent in establishments from the same district.   10
Table 2:  Determinants of labour turnover and wages in German firms 
   ( O L S  est.; pooled data for 1997-2001; establishments < 200 employees) 















Newly founded establishment 




(number of employees) 
-0.0010** 
(-5.60) 




























Covered by sectoral collective 
agreement (dummy: 1 = yes) 
-0.0331** 
(-2.80) 
Covered by firm-level collective 




(ln daily wage per employee, in €) 
-0.1988** 
(-8.43) 
Firm receives wage subsidies 



















































































































Legal form of the firm 









Regional unemployment rate 









Year dummies  yes*  yes  yes**  yes** 
Industry dummies   yes**     yes**  yes**  yes** 












NOTE:  Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses; **/* denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively; see text for exact definitions of dependent variables. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics.   11
The results of the pooled estimations of the labour turnover rate for the period 
1997 to 2001 (which also include dummies for each year) are presented in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. It can be seen that most of the coefficients estimated 
are of the expected sign, but not all of them are statistically significant at 
conventional levels, and the overall explanatory power of the regressions is 
modest. While the impact of control variables needs not to be discussed in detail, it 
is important to note that newly founded establishments have higher labour 
turnover rates than incumbent ones. This difference shows up in western as in 
eastern Germany and is statistically significant at the 1  percent level, thus 
confirming our theoretical hypothesis above. 
 
The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables for newly founded 
establishments can be interpreted as follows: The average labour turnover rate in 
our sample is 0.39 in western and 0.42 in eastern Germany, which means that 
labour fluctuations (i.e. hires and departures) amount to 39 and 42 percent of the 
average stock of employment, respectively. In newly founded establishments, this 
rate is 9.8 percentage points higher in western Germany and even 14.7 
percentage points higher in eastern Germany. In other words, over the first five 
years labour turnover rates in newly founded firms are one quarter to one-third 
higher than in incumbent firms. 
 
In addition to the average effects over the whole period shown in Table 2, Table 3 
presents the results of cross section estimations for each single year. The models 
estimated are almost identical to those shown in Table  2, the only differences 
being that the year dummies are not included, of course, and that for all years 
except 1999 (where information is lacking) a dummy variable on the existence of 
overtime work is included. In order to economize on space, Table 3 just presents 
the estimated coefficients of the dummy variable for newly founded establishments 
(full results are available from the authors on request). It can be seen that the 
labour turnover rate in newly founded firms is higher than in incumbent firms only 
for a relatively short period of time and that start-ups assimilate fast: After three 
years in western Germany and four years in eastern Germany the difference in 
labour turnover rates between both types of firms is not statistically significant 
anymore. 
 
Table  3 also provides estimates of hires and departures that largely mirror the 
labour turnover results. As expected, hiring in newly founded establishments is 
stronger than in similar incumbent establishments, but only in the first two to three 
years. The same is true for departures: Already in the second year in western   12
Germany and in the fourth year in eastern Germany, jobs in newly founded firms 
seem to be as stable as those in incumbent firms. These results probably reflect 
an initial period of new employment relationships, uncertainty and likely failure of 
newly founded firms that is characterized by difficult matching processes and a 
higher frequency of labour adjustment in both directions. They show that 
concerning labour fluctuation it takes a new firm only a few years to become an 
incumbent firm. 
 
Table 3:  Labour fluctuation in newly founded firms over time 
      (coefficients of OLS estimations similar to Table 2, columns 2 and 3) 
Indicator,  region  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 

















































































NOTE:  Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses; **/* denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively; see text for exact definitions of dependent variables. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics. 
 
4. BARGAINING COVERAGE AND WAGE SETTING 
In Germany, wages and working conditions are predominantly determined by 
collective bargaining between trade unions and employers associations or single 
employers at sectoral or firm level, respectively. Since the powerful German trade   13
unions have been able to push through wages that are relatively generous in 
international comparison and since negotiated working conditions (such as 
working hours, annual leave or fringe benefits) are usually much better than 
stipulated by law, establishments and employees covered by collective bargaining 
can be assumed to have high-quality jobs. Although less than 50 percent of 
establishments in western Germany and just about 25 percent of establishments in 
eastern Germany are covered by collective agreements, these agreements 
determine wages and working conditions of about 70 percent of employees in 
western and 45 percent of employees in eastern Germany: In addition, quite a few 
firms that are not officially bound by collective agreements use these as a point of 
reference in setting wages and working conditions (see Kohaut and Schnabel 
2003). 
 
Table 4:   Bargaining coverage of newly founded firms 
        (share of firms covered by a collective agreement, in percent) 
Western 
Germany 



















1 to 4  37  46  34  31  40  40 
5 to 9  39  64  47  50  60  58 
10 to 19  54  70  27  57  42  51 
20 to 199  ---  76  ---  73  ---  67 























1 to 4  27  32  13  18  25  21 
5 to 9  39  41  28  27  21  29 
10 to 19  34  50  32  45  18  38 
20 to 199  62  66  52  53  38  53 
Average  31 41 19 30 24 30 
NOTE: weighted data (cross-section weights); --- indicates that data may not be published due to an 
insufficient number of observations. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel.   14
Making use of representative data from the IAB Establishment panel and 
concentrating on our restricted sample of establishments with less than 200 
employees, Table  4 compares the bargaining coverage of newly founded 
establishments with that of incumbent establishments in several size intervals. It 
can be seen that in 1997 only 39 percent of newly founded firms in western 
Germany were covered by a collective agreement whereas among incumbent 
firms the bargaining coverage rate was 59 percent. This overall difference of 20 
percentage points is statistically significant, and similar differences show up in 
each size interval. In eastern Germany, where the bargaining coverage is 
generally lower, newly founded firms are also significantly less likely to be covered 
by a collective agreement than incumbent ones. 
 
Over time, there is a certain convergence between both types of firms, which is 
partly due to the falling coverage rates of incumbent firms reflecting the gradual 
erosion of the German system of industry-wide wage bargaining. Even in 2001, 
however, the bargaining coverage rate of newly founded establishments was 
significantly lower than that of incumbents in western and eastern Germany. This 
result is consistent with econometric evidence from Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) 
showing that young establishments (i.e. those founded in the last five years) are 
less likely to be bound by collective agreements. 
 
While coverage by a collective agreement does give a good general impression on 
the quality of wages and working conditions in a plant, a more precise indicator is 
the level of wages. Newly founded firms are usually equated with small firms, and 
for these we know that they tend to pay lower wages, ceteris paribus (standard 
references include Brown et al. 1990 and Oi and Idson 1999; for Germany, see 
Schmidt 1995 and Wagner 1997). It is an open question, however, whether newly 
founded firms pay higher or lower wages than incumbent firms of the same size.
11 
 
There are several reasons why wages in newly founded firms may differ from 
those in incumbent firms (for more general discussions see Brown and Medoff 
2003 and Brixy et al. 2004). On the one hand, newly founded firms may have to 
pay higher wages than incumbent ones in order to attract employees from the 
external labour market. If potential employees take into consideration that newly 
founded firms are much more likely to expire than older ones and have a higher 
                                             
11  There is an emerging literature that tries to find out whether the age of a firm has an influence 
on the wages paid to its employees and that provides some information on the wage differential 
of young firms (see, e.g., Audretsch et al. 2001 for the Netherlands, Brown and Medoff 2003 for 
the US and Kölling et al. 2002 for Germany). However, these studies do not pay special 
attention to newly founded firms and do not follow an age cohort of firms over time.   15
labour turnover, they can be expected to demand higher wages than those that 
they receive from their current employers (or are offered by other firms) in the 
sense of a wage differential compensating for the increased risk of a job loss. 
Wage demands will also be higher if potential employees recognize that newly 
founded firms offer fewer fringe benefits (such as pension plans) than long-
established firms. With a falling risk of failure (and an increase in fringe benefits) 
over time, the size of this compensating wage differential can be expected to fall. 
 
On the other hand, wages in newly founded firms may be lower than in incumbent 
firms because of their lower ability to pay. In the start-up phase of a business it is 
essential for survival to keep labour costs as low as possible, and any claim of 
inability to pay higher wages is much more credible (and more likely to be 
accepted by the employees) when made by a newly founded firm than by a long-
surviving firm. Furthermore, newly founded firms do not have to pay the wage 
premiums for tenure and firm-specific knowledge which employees in incumbent 
firms command.
12 Over time, this negative wage differential should become 
smaller since a firm’s ability to pay can be expected to rise and since its 
employees acquire tenure and valuable firm-specific human capital. 
 
These contrasting theoretical hypotheses suggest that an empirical investigation 
may be worthwhile. As in the analyses of labour fluctuation we estimate OLS 
regressions for the period 1997 to 2001, making use of stacked cross section 
models for each year as well as pooling the data. The dependent variable is the 
log of daily wages per (full-time equivalent) employee at establishment level. It is 
calculated by dividing the annual sum of all wages and salaries in an 
establishment by the sum of (calendar) days worked by all employees in this 
establishment. Since the number of days with part-time work is divided by 0.5, we 
in fact calculate a sort of “full-time equivalents” of employment. Because of part-
time work and fluctuations in employment our denominator is more precise than 
just using the number of employees at some point in time. The data stem from the 
“German Employment Statistics” and include all wages and salaries paid to each 
employee during a job up to the contribution assessment ceiling of the social 
security system. Since higher earnings are censored at this ceiling, wages in firms 
                                             
12  In this case, the new firm may not be able to poach employees from other firms but may rely 
more on attracting workers who are currently unemployed, who are out of the labour force or 
who search for their first job. There may also exist non-monetary incentives that help newly 
founded firms to hire employees in spite of lower wages. These include enthusiasm for the 
business idea and the attractiveness of a situation with flat hierarchies where structures can still 
be formed. Some employees could also speculate that they are first in line and therefore in a 
good position for a career within the firm. Others may prefer to stay in the region where they 
finished their education and/or where they are well integrated in networks of friends and family.   16
of high-income sectors are underreported. Although there is a certain downward 
bias in our wage variable, this should not systematically and seriously affect our 
results on the wage differential.
13 
 
Again our main explanatory variable of interest is the dummy variable indicating 
whether an establishment hired its first employee between 1  July, 1995, and 
30  June, 1996. The control variables are quite similar to those in the labour 
turnover regressions above. They include the number of employees in the 
establishment and its square (which are expected to exhibit the well-known 
positive but decreasing establishment size effect on wages) as well as a dummy 
variable indicating whether the establishment is a branch plant or subsidiary (thus 
probably paying higher wages than similar independent firms). The structure of the 
workforce is represented by the employment shares of female and low-skilled 
employees (both of which are expected to receive lower wages), of high-skilled 
employees (with higher wages), and of fixed-term and part-time employees. 
Although there is no such thing as a unionized establishment in Germany, it is 
necessary to control for the existence of sectoral or firm-level collective bargaining 
agreements, both of which are expected to raise wages. The ability to pay of an 
establishment is expressed by a dummy variable reflecting its profit situation. We 
also take into account the state of production technology in the establishment, 
which should be positively correlated with wages, as well as the regional 
unemployment rate, which can be expected to reduce wages. Additional 
explanatory variables are the export share of an establishment, which should be 
associated with rising wages, the existence of wage subsidies and the legal form 
of the firm, although we have no clear-cut priors on the likely influence of the latter 
variables on the wages paid. We also include ten industry dummies and three 
dummies for the degree of urbanization at the location of the establishment. Since 
wages in western Germany are still substantially higher than in post-communist 
eastern Germany and since both labour markets still differ considerably, we 
provide disaggregated estimates for western and eastern Germany. 
 
                                             
13  This contribution assessment ceiling is relatively high, amounting to 148 € in western and 124 € 
in eastern Germany per calendar-day in 2001. As the wage variable used is calculated at the 
establishment level whereas the contribution assessment ceiling refers to the individual level, 
there is no clear-cut truncation point which could be taken into account by choosing appropriate 
estimation methods (such as Tobit or truncated regression). At the other end of the spectrum, 
there was a small number of wages reported that were obviously too low and that probably 
reflected errors in the data base. We therefore omitted all incomes that were lower than twice 
the wages paid for so-called “mini jobs” (for which only flat-rate taxes are paid). This lower 
threshold was 21.18 € per day in 2001 in both parts of Germany.   17
The results of the pooled estimations for the period 1997 to 2001 (which also 
include dummies for each year) are presented in Table 2. For western and eastern 
Germany alike, the goodness of fit of the regressions is relatively high and almost 
all coefficients estimated are significant and of the expected sign. The principal 
result is of course the negative effect of the newly founded establishment dummy 
on log wages. Over the entire period, wages paid in newly founded establishments 
in western Germany were 8.6  percent lower than in other firms, whereas in 
eastern Germany this average wage differential was just 5.5 percent.
14 This 
difference probably reflects the fact that wages in eastern Germany are generally 
about 20 percent lower, ceteris paribus, and that new firms thus may have less 
scope for paying even lower wages there. 
 
Table 5:  Wage differentials of newly founded firms over time 
      (coefficients of OLS estimations similar to Table 2, columns 4 and 5) 

























Note:  Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses; **/* denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, German Employment Statistics. 
 
In addition to the average effects over the whole period shown in Table 2, Table 5 
presents the results of cross section estimations for each single year. The models 
estimated are almost identical to those shown in Table 2,
15 and by and large they 
are equally well determined. In order to economize on space, Table 5 just presents 
the estimated coefficients of the dummy variable for newly founded firms (full 
results are available from the authors on request). It can be seen that the point 
estimates of the wage differential tend to fall and lose significance over time: While 
in 1997 wages were 9.4  percent lower in newly founded western German 
establishments than in other plants, ceteris paribus, in 2001 the point estimate of 
the wage differential between these two groups of plants was just 4.4 percent. In 
eastern Germany, the wage differential fell from 5.7 percent in 1997 to 3.8 percent 
                                             
14  The percentage wage effect is calculated from the estimated coefficient β as (e
β−1)⋅100. 
15  As before, the only differences are that the year dummies are not included, of course, and that 
for all years except 1999 (where information is lacking) a dummy variable on the existence of 
overtime work is included which always proves to be significant.   18
in 2001.
16 Moreover, the wage differential between newly founded and incumbent 
establishments becomes statistically insignificant after four years in western 
Germany whereas in eastern Germany this process takes five years. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The question whether job quality differs between newly founded and incumbent 
firms of the same size and whether such differences vanish over time once the 
new businesses mature has received surprisingly little attention so far. We provide 
a first empirical analysis that tackles these issues following a cohort of newly 
founded and other establishments with less than 200 employees in western and 
eastern Germany from 1997 to 2001. Our results indicate that start-ups are 
characterized by higher labour fluctuation, lower bargaining coverage and lower 
wages than incumbent establishments. These differences are shown to decline 
and become insignificant over time as the newly founded firms mature. This result 
implies that – at least concerning our indicators of employment quality – it takes a 
new firm only a few years to become an incumbent firm. 
 
In order to establish the stability and generality of our results, the analyses should 
be replicated with cohorts for other years and with data for other countries. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to know more about the reasons for the 
initially higher labour turnover and the negative wage differential found, but these 
are difficult to identify and disentangle. One reason could be that newly founded 
firms rely more on workers that are recruited from the pool of unemployed or from 
out of the labour force; these may be less expensive but also less likely to survive 
the crucial initial period of a new employment relationship. Unfortunately we are 
not able to analyze this possibility since we do not have reliable information yet on 
the origin of employees in an establishment. 
 
Like this, some of our other questions could be answered more precisely by 
tracing the employment of individuals in various (newly founded and incumbent) 
establishments over the years. For instance, by investigating how the wage of a 
given employee changes when he or she moves from an incumbent to a newly 
                                             
16  Since these estimates might be biased in various ways due to the failure (or non-reporting) of 
newly founded and other firms in the panel, we made several checks using the full sample of all 
firms on which data were available (see Brixy et al. 2004 for details). We found that the wages 
paid in surviving firms do not differ significantly from those in other firms, thus confirming the 
result of Audretsch et al. (2001: 818) that “differentials in employee compensation are far more 
attributable to firm size than to whether the firm ultimately survives or fails.”   19
founded establishment we may be able to identify the wage differential more 
precisely. It would also be interesting to see how often employees in newly 
founded firms experience job losses and how their wages evolve over time 
compared to that of similar employees that did not choose to work in a start-up. 
These issues point to promising areas for further research that we intend to 
investigate in the future. 
 
REFERENCES 
Addison, John T., Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner, 2001, ‘Works councils in 
Germany: their effects on establishment performance’, Oxford Economic 
Papers 53, 659-694. 
Almus, Matthias, 2002, Wachstumsdeterminanten junger Unternehmen, Baden-
Baden: Nomos. 
Audretsch, David B., George van Leeuwen, Bert Menkveld and Roy Thurik, 2001, 
‘Market dynamics in the Netherlands: Competition policy and the role of small 
firms’, International Journal of Industrial Organization 19, 795-821. 
Barnes, Matthew and Jonathan Haskel, 2002, Job Creation, Job Destruction and 
the Contribution of Small Businesses: Evidence for UK Manufacturing, 
Department of Economics Working Paper No. 461, Queen Mary, University 
of London. 
Bellmann, Lutz, Herbert Düll, Jürgen Kühl, Manfred Lahner and Udo Lehmann, 
1996,  Flexibilität von Betrieben in Deutschland, Nürnberg: Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. 
Boeri, Tito and Ulrich Cramer, 1991, ‘Betriebliche Wachstumsprozesse: Eine 
statistische Analyse mit der Beschäftigtenstatistik 1977-1987’, Mitteilungen 
aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 24, 70-80. 
Brixy, Udo and Reinhold Grotz, 2004, ‘Entry Rates, the Share of Surviving 
Businesses and Employment Growth: Differences between Western and 
Eastern Germany since Unification‘, in Michael Dowling, Jürgen Schmude 
and Dodo zu Knyphausen-Aufsess (eds.), Advances in Interdisciplinary 
European Entrepreneurship Research, Münster, 143-152. 
Brixy, Udo and Susanne Kohaut, 1999, ‘Employment Growth Determinants in New 
Firms in Eastern Germany’, Small Business Economics 13, 155-170. 
Brixy, Udo, Susanne Kohaut and Claus Schnabel, 2004, Do newly founded firms 
pay lower wages? First evidence from Germany, Discussion Paper No. 28, 
Lehrstuhl für Arbeitsmarkt- und Regionalpolitik der Friedrich-Alexander-
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg. 
Brown, Charles, James Hamilton and James L. Medoff, 1990, Employers Large 
and Small, Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 
Brown, Charles and James L. Medoff, 2003, ‘Firm Age and Wages’, Journal of 
Labor Economics 21, 677-697.   20
Brüderl, Josef, Peter Preisendörfer and Rolf Ziegler, 1996, Der Erfolg 
neugegründeter Betriebe, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 
Davis, Stephen J., John C. Haltiwanger and Scott Schuh, 1996, Job Creation and 
Destruction, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Dunne, Timothy, Mark J. Roberts and Larry Samuelson, 1989, ‘The growth and 
failure of U.S. manufacturing plants’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 
671-698. 
European Commission, 2001, Employment in Europe 2001: Recent Trends and 
Prospects, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities. 
Franz, Wolfgang, 2003, Arbeitsmarktökonomik, 5
th ed., Berlin: Springer. 
Fritsch, Michael and Udo Brixy, 2004, ‘The Establishment File of the German 
Social Insurance Statistics’, Schmollers Jahrbuch 124, 183-190. 
Fritsch, Michael and Antje Weyh, 2004, How Large are the Direct Employment 
Effects of New Businesses? An Empirical Investigation, Working Paper No. 
05/2004, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Technische Universität 
Bergakademie Freiberg. 
Gerlach, Knut and Joachim Wagner, 1997, ‘Analysen zur Nachfrageseite des 
Arbeitsmarktes mit Betriebspaneldaten aus Erhebungen der amtlichen 
Industriestatistik – Ein Überblick über Ansätze und Ergebnisse für 
niedersächsische Industriebetriebe‘, in Jürgen Kühl, Manfred Lahner and 
Joachim Wagner (eds.), Die Nachfrageseite des Arbeitsmarktes – 
Ergebnisse aus Analysen mit deutschen Firmenpaneldaten, Nürnberg: 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 
11-82. 
Kölling, Arnd, 2000, ‘The IAB-Establishment Panel’, Schmollers Jahrbuch, Journal 
of Applied Social Science Studies 120, 291-300. 
Kölling, Arnd, Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner, 2002, Establishment Age and 
Wages: Evidence from German Linked Employer-Employee Data, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 679, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. 
Kohaut, Susanne and Claus Schnabel, 2003, ‘Tarifverträge – nein danke!? 
Ausmaß und Einflussfaktoren der Tarifbindung west- und ostdeutscher 
Betriebe’, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 223, 312-331. 
Oi, Walter Y. and Todd Idson, 1999, ‘Firm Size and Wages’, in Orley Ashenfelter 
and David Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science, 2165-2214. 
Schmidt, Elke Maria, 1995, Betriebsgröße, Beschäftigtenentwicklung und 
Entlohnung, Frankfurt, New York: Campus. 
Stinchcombe, Arthur L., 1965, ‘Social structures and organizations‘, in James G. 
March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations, Chicago: Rand McNally, 142-193. 
Storey, David J., 1994, Understanding the Small Business Sector, London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Turk, Florian, 2002, ‘Der Mittelstand als Beschäftigungsmotor, Fakt oder Fiktion?’, 
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 28, 254-271.   21
Wagner, Joachim, 1994, ‘The post-entry performance of new small firms in 
German manufacturing industries’, Journal of Industrial Economics 42, 141-
154. 
Wagner, Joachim, 1997, ‘Firm Size and Job Quality: A Survey of the Evidence 
from Germany’, Small Business Economics 9, 411-425. 
Wagner, Joachim, 1999, ‘The Life History of Cohorts of Exits from German 
Manufacturing’, Small Business Economics 13, 71-79.  
In der Diskussionspapierreihe sind zuletzt erschienen: 
 
Recently published Discussion Papers: 
  
 
30 Brixy,  U., 
Kohaut, S., 
Schnabel, C. 
How fast do newly founded firms mature? 
Empirical analyses on job quality in start-ups 
11/2004
29 Andrews,  M.J., 
Schank, T., 
Upward, R. 
Practical estimation methods for linked 
employer-employee data 
09/2004
28 Brixy,  U., 
Kohaut, S., 
Schnabel, C. 
Do newly founded firms pay lower wages? 
First evidence from Germany 
07/2004
27 Schank,  T. 
Schnabel, C.,  
Wagner, J. 
Exporting firms do not pay higher wages, 
ceteris paribus. First evidence from linked 
employer-employee data 
06/2004
26 List,  J., 
Schnabel, C. 
Bildungsstagnation bei abnehmender 
Erwerbsbevölkerung – Bildungspolitische 
Herausforderungen durch Geringqualifizierte 
05/2004
25 Andrews,  M.J., 
Schank, T., 
Simmons, R. 
Does Worksharing Work? Some Empirical 
Evidence from the IAB Panel 
05/2004
24 Schank,  T., 
Schnabel, C. 
Betriebliche Determinanten des Überstunden-
einsatzes 
02/2004
23 Kohaut,  S., 
Schnabel, C. 
Verbreitung, Ausmaß und Determinanten der 
übertariflichen Entlohnung 
12/2003
22 Addison,  J.T.,   
Schnabel, C.,  
Wagner, J. 
The Course of Research into the Economic 
Consequences of German Works Councils 
11/2003
21 Addison,  J.T.,   
Schank, T. 
Schnabel, C.,  
Wagner, J. 
German Works Councils in the Production 
Process 
07/2003









An updated list of discussion papers can be found at the homepage: 
http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/ 